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THE SPHERE OF EXPERIENCE IN LOCKE
The Relations Between Reflection, Consciousness, and Ideas

VILI LÄHTEENMÄKI

Tho’ we say, for Instance, that the Understanding is Conscious, or acts consciously; yet we do not, nor can properly say, that Consciousness understands; or at all Thinks; at least, not after that precise and appropriate manner of Attribution, wherein Thought, or the Act of Thinking, is ascribed to the Understanding. Wherefore the Understanding does not belong to Consciousness; but Consciousness belongs to the Understanding, and, as appears, is an essential Property, or natural Consequent of it.


Introduction
Locke endorses a distinction between passive reflection and voluntary attentive reflection, which he occasionally labels contemplation. Failure to recognize this distinction properly has had an effect on interpretations of Locke’s theory of reflection, and caused puzzlement about the relation between reflection and consciousness. In particular, the function of reflection as a passive internal sense that produces simple ideas of mental operations has been downplayed in favour of the view that reflection in one manner or another involves attention and/or presupposes consciousness of mental operations. This has led a number of scholars to maintain, implicitly or explicitly, that Locke in fact abandons either his doctrine of sensation and reflection as the two exclusive sources of ideas or his doctrine of ideas as the only immediate objects of experience.1 According to one reading, ideas of mental operations


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are produced by virtue of consciousness, and reflection is assigned the role of forming definite ideas. This conflicts with Locke’s official doctrine of sensation and reflection as the only origins of ideas. According to another reading, ideas are not at all involved in our direct consciousness of mental operations, but the production of ideas through reflection is preconditioned by this primary consciousness. This means introducing immediate objects of experience that are not ideas, which conflicts with Locke’s commitment to ideas as the only immediate objects of all kinds of thinking.

With the help of a distinction between reflection as a source of ideas and reflection as an operation about ideas I show how Locke can hold to his empiricist maxim about the two sources of ideas and also endorse ideas as the only immediate objects of experience. A proper understanding of Locke’s theory of reflection requires that reflection and consciousness be delineated with respect to one another. I will show how Locke’s notion of consciousness differs from both types of reflection. Consciousness signifies experiential knowledge that accompanies all thought, whereas both types of reflection are acts of thought. Moreover, the first type of reflection produces ideas of which we become conscious to some degree spontaneously, while the second type of reflection, as a volitional operation about ideas, presupposes consciousness of its potential objects. These points undermine the not uncommon view that Locke is ambiguous about the sameness or difference of consciousness and reflection. Finally, I argue that Locke adopts a degree conception


2 Kulstad (1984), 167. Rebecca Copenhaver even quotes Locke’s description of reflection as a source of ideas in Essay, II. i. 4 with ‘consciousness’ inserted in square brackets: ‘though it [consciousness] be not Sense…’ (‘Reid on Consciousness: HOP, HOT OR FOR?’, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 57 (2007), 613–34: 614), although Locke is expressly
of consciousness when he allows that we experience ideas in the mind in different ways. As an overall consequence, we attain a novel perspective from which we can see how Locke’s views about reflection, contemplation, consciousness, mental operations, and ideas all align so that neither Locke’s commitment to the two sources of ideas nor to ideas as the only immediate objects of experience has to be compromised.

1. Setting the Stage: Ideas as Experiences
In his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, Thomas Reid comments on philosophers’ incoherent use of ‘idea’. He faults Locke for ambiguous usage of the term:

Perhaps it was unfortunate for Mr Locke that he used the word idea so very frequently as to make it very difficult to give the attention necessary to put it always to the same meaning. And it appears evident that, in many places, he means nothing more by it but the notion or conception we have of any object of thought; that is, the act of the mind in conceiving it, and not the object conceived.  

According to an early eighteenth-century assessment, by the end of the previous century the crucial issue concerning the nature of idea had become whether it ‘be only a Modification of the Mind, or be a Distinct Being, or Substance United to the Mind’. Importantly, there was no significant debate on another aspect, namely that ‘idea’ signifies ‘Representation of something in the Mind’. On this point, it was argued, ‘all sides are agreed’. Locke too explains that an idea is present to the understanding ‘as a Sign or Representation of the talking about reflection in the passage.


thing’ it is about (E: IV. xxi. 4, 721; see also II. xxx. 5, 374).\textsuperscript{5} Sometimes he couples ‘idea’ with ‘appearance’. For instance, in The Epistle to the Reader he tells us that by ‘determinate … simple idea’ ‘I mean that simple appearance, which the Mind has in its view, or perceives in itself, when that Idea is said to be in it’.\textsuperscript{6} Neither of Locke’s expressions betrays much of the possible further characteristics of ideas, however—whether they should be understood as acts of the mind or as entities in themselves—because the representative function and the appearance nature of ideas neither entail nor exclude such characteristics. Appearance and representation, for their part, are closely associated, since having an appearance often presumes an object as its cause and, accordingly, as that of which the appearance is a representation.\textsuperscript{7}

There are still echoes of Reid’s sentiments in the present century.\textsuperscript{8} The recent debate over the status of ideas in Locke’s thought has largely concentrated on the epistemological ramifications: whether Locke maintains direct perceptual realism or a branch of representationalism that is subject to scepticism.\textsuperscript{9} John


\textsuperscript{6} Epistle to the Reader, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{7} This is not always the case. The idea of pain (as an experience), for instance, is not necessarily caused by an object, nor need it have intentional content. Similarly, it is not clear whether ideas from reflection should be taken to have phenomenal content in the same sense as an idea of a material object does. Even so, it seems clear that ideas from reflection are in some way experientially given to the subject that has them.

\textsuperscript{8} For a very recent discussion, see the special issue ‘Locke and the Veil of Perception’, of Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85 (3) (2004).

\textsuperscript{9} For the point I wish to make concerning the status of ideas it suffices to give broad outlines of the contrast between what might be called the ontic and appearance or representational and direct realist interpretations of ideas. These two divisions are not necessarily equivalent. See Ian Tipton, ‘“Ideas” and “Objects”: Locke on Perceiving “Things”’, in Minds, Ideas, and Objects, ed. Phillip D. Cummins and Guenter Zoeller (Atascadero, Ca.: Ridgeview, 1992), 97–110, for a useful overview of the diversity of positions on the issue.
Yolton has extensively argued that Locke shares Arnauld’s understanding of the presence of ideas in the mind as equivalent to having appearances, and sees that as a way out from the sceptical focal point.\textsuperscript{10} Yolton maintains that inasmuch as ideas represent they do so without being representational entities. Having an idea signifies a direct way of cognizing the object of perception. According to Yolton, through de-ontologizing ideas Locke places emphasis on the fact that our perceiving of objects involves awareness of those objects.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, it has been pointed out that Locke never positively disengages from the traditional ontology of ideas. Rather, he is agnostic about the ontological nature of ideas at best and assumes the mode/substance ontology of his close predecessors.\textsuperscript{12} On broadly similar lines, it has been argued that Locke cannot do without treating ideas as entities, which means that he must grant ideas weightier status than that of de-ontologized appearances.\textsuperscript{13} It has also been argued that ontic and appearance interpretations (or representationalist and direct realist interpretations) are not inescapably incompatible, but that the ontic and appearance statuses can be treated as complementary aspects of ideas.\textsuperscript{14}

that also shows how very difficult it is to spell out the crux of the interpretational dispute.

\textsuperscript{10} John W. Yolton, \textit{Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid} (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1984), 222.


Adjudicating between these readings is not essential here, but it is helpful to see how the suggested approach to Locke’s view of ideas is compatible with them. While Locke himself is notoriously taciturn about the ontological specifics of ideas, he expressly recognizes the sceptical threat ensuing from the discrepancy between things in themselves and how they appear to us: ‘’Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the intervention of the Ideas it has of them. … How shall the Mind, when it perceives nothing but its own Ideas, know that they agree with Things themselves?’; knowledge requires ‘conformity between our Ideas and the reality of things’ (E: IV. iv. 3, 563). Locke’s answer is that for an idea to agree with reality, it ‘must necessarily be the product of Things operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing therein those Perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to’ (E: IV. iv. 4, 563–4; see also II. xxx. 2, 372).

Locke endorses an ordained course of events as guaranteeing the production of veridical perceptions in us. Presumably, he either believes, on a general level, that for the sceptical threat to surface it representative and direct realism. In sense perception, ideas are the end products of external objects affecting our sense organs, and as such they are ‘the interface between the mental and the physical’ (p. 253). But there are two equally acceptable characterizations of ideas: not only can we refer to the objects that cause them, we can also refer to the way those objects appear to us. From the latter perspective ideas are the ‘phenomenal facts of experience. They are, in short, experiences’ (ibid.). Tipton, for his part, points out that through his ‘pragmatic dismissal’ of scepticism Locke maintains that we perceive both ideas and objects themselves, although this does not mean that we have the same degree of certainty of the existence of external objects as we have of the existence of ideas (p. 107). The question of how ideas relate to their causes is certainly an important one. For the present purpose, the views of Rogers and Tipton function as important reminders that the motivation for exploring the causes of ideas is preconditioned by the fact that they come as experientially given.

15 In his discussion of personal identity, Locke makes a similar point concerning the conformity between our consciousness of a past action that we attribute to ourselves and the reality of that action, i.e. whether the action we remember as belonging to ourselves was really performed by us, someone else, or nobody. Locke concludes that this ‘will by us, … be best resolv’d into the Goodness of God’ (E: II. xxvii. 13, 338).
is sufficient that knowledge is taken to be possible only through how things appear to us, and therefore the ontological specifics of idea are not worth pursuing; or he thinks that although knowledge of the ontological nature of idea—as it were, as the vehicle of appearance—could help to overcome scepticism, we still lack epistemic access to the underlying ontology. In any case, he does not initiate an examination of the ontological nature of ideas beyond contending that they are the immediate objects of perception. In the debates on Locke’s epistemology, especially as regards the readings that grant ontic representational status to ideas, this aspect is not germane since the central issue is whether ideas are liable to bar our epistemic access to the external world. As with the appearance readings, even though they emphasize the status of ideas as experiences, the purpose is to show that there is no obscuring veil of ideas between the mind and the world.

The approach I take in this paper is that whether ideas are to be conceived of as modifications or acts of the mind, or entities possibly distinct from both the perceptual act and the ultimate object, in each case there is a perfectly acceptable sense in which they are (also) lived-through experiences. Indeed, Locke explains that having ideas means being conscious of them. Everyone is ‘conscious to himself, That he thinks, and that which his Mind is employ’d about whilst thinking, being the Ideas, that are there’ (E: II. i. 1, 104). Thinking presupposes ideas, since ‘the Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own Ideas’ (E: IV. i. 1, 525). It is thus strictly speaking only by virtue of ideas as the immediate objects of thought that we can be said to perceive or think about anything. Finally, there is no thinking of which we are not conscious, because ‘consciousness … is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it’, ‘consciousness always accompanies thinking’ (E: II. xxvii. 9, 335). This means that there are no occurrent ideas in the mind that are not experientially given to the perceiver. In essence, consciousness signifies the sphere of experience, where ideas are what are experienced.
Taking my cue from the status of ideas as experiences, I shall next distinguish between reflection and consciousness. Then I will examine Locke’s parallelism between reflection and sensation, and then explain the distinction of two types of reflection. Then I will investigate the evidence for Locke’s understanding of consciousness as experiential knowledge. In the following two sections I will consider cases where Locke seems to allow for unconscious ideas and mental operations that pass in the mind so that reflection does not produce ideas of them at all. I argue that he allows neither, and elucidate this in the following section by showing that Locke endorses a degree conception of consciousness. Lastly, I position the present reading with respect to some prominent interpretations of Locke’s theory of reflection.

2. Reflection and Consciousness

On the one hand, it has been argued that Locke treats consciousness and reflection as overlapping notions through either positively equating them or failing to distinguish between them. On the other hand, some scholars posit a difference, although they account for it in different ways. Most prominently, the distinction has been drawn on the basis that reflection presupposes attention, whereas consciousness is deemed to lack such a feature.


17 Gibson (1917), 57; O’Connor (1957), 97; McRae (1976), 16, 34; Thiel (1994), 103; Bolton (2007), 86. Kulstad (1984), 150, examines this line of interpretation under two readings of attention—as voluntary directedness and as focusing of attention—and while acknowledging their merits, he concludes that because of conflicting motivations Locke can restrict reflection to neither of these senses and that in the end both fail to address certain tensions in distinguishing consciousness from reflection. Curiously, Kulstad draws a distinction between two types of consciousness, but does not consider a distinction between different types of reflection, except in passing (p. 166). Scharp (2008), 28, argues
Locke characterizes consciousness and reflection in strikingly similar ways, apt to suggest at least their partial synonymity: ‘Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man’s own mind’ \((E: \text{II. i. 19, 115})\) whereas reflection ‘is the Per*ception of the Operations of our own Minds within us’ \((E: \text{II. i. 4, 105})\). According to the received view, operations of the mind count as what passes in the mind, while there are things that may pass in the mind other than operations of the mind. This seems to make each case of reflection a case of consciousness, while not all cases of consciousness are cases of reflection. In his meticulous study of the relation between the two concepts, Mark Kulstad argues that, given the various contexts these concepts are applied in, Locke must widen the notion of reflection so that it is occasionally synonymous with consciousness.\(^{18}\)

To my knowledge, it has gone unnoticed in the secondary literature that the whole issue of sameness of consciousness and reflection need not arise at all. It is a mistake to start off with the supposition that consciousness and reflection can align so that they could be synonymous. In a specific sense that will become clear later, they overlap so that what is an object of reflection is a content of consciousness, but we should not let this conceal their core conceptual difference.\(^{19}\)

Consider Locke’s distinction between passive and active powers. In receiving an impression, an agent ‘acts merely by the capacity that reflection is different from consciousness, and in itself involuntary, yet a voluntary act of attention is intimately associated with it.

\(^{18}\) Kulstad (1984), 167. According to Scharp (2008), 47, ‘one can admit that mental operations are among the things that pass in one’s mind without accepting the view that we are conscious of all of them’. I will touch upon this claim later on.

\(^{19}\) One complication for seeing the difference is that both reflection and consciousness are reflexive notions. Reflection is obviously reflexive. Consciousness, for its part, is reflexive in the sense that it reveals itself as a by-product of affording the principal object of perception so that it is ‘impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive’ \((E: \text{II. xxvii. 9, 335})\). In the following, I disregard the similarity pertaining to reflexivity in the sense explained here and concentrate on the differences.
it has to receive such an impression from some external Agent; and such a Power is not properly an Active Power, but a mere passive capacity in the subject. Sometimes the … Agent, puts itself into Action by its own Power, and this is properly Active Power’ (E: II. xxi. 72, 285). Consider now the following list of some operations of the mind: ‘Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own Minds; which we [are] conscious of …’ (E: II. i. 4, 105; see also II. vi. 2, 128 and II. xix. 1–4, 226–9). We can recognize that some operations are proper actions (e.g. willing) and some are what for want of a better label I call passive actings (e.g. perception).²⁰

This last quotation illustrates that Locke understands consciousness as an accompanying feature of all mental actings, passive or active, representing our mental operations to ourselves as the kind of operations they are. I will shortly argue for a distinction between two types of reflection. The type that functions as a source of ideas signifies an operation through which ‘the Understanding comes to be furnished with’ ideas of mental operations (E: Introduction §3, 44). The other type of reflection signifies an operation about ideas that have already been produced in the mind. Both types of reflection count as mental operations, passive and active, respectively, whereas consciousness is not a mental operation. This is a crucial difference, and in the light of it the question of sameness of reflection and consciousness turns out to be a non-starter. The difference will be further reinforced through considering in detail the distinction between the two types of reflection and the question of how consciousness relates to them.

3. Reflection and Sensation
Among the various passages where Locke makes use of ‘reflection’, the most considered characterization is in his discussion of the two sources of ideas. The first source is sensation, which furnishes the

²⁰ In the following, I use ‘act’ as a term that encompasses both an act proper and a passive acting, but whenever useful I will resort to these more specific terms.
mind with ideas of external objects and sensible qualities (E: II. i. 3, 105). The second source is reflection, by which Locke means ‘that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof, there come to be Ideas of these Operations in the Understanding’ (E: II. i. 4, 105). The present argument about the nature of reflection and its place in Locke’s system relies on the point that Locke treats these two sources on a par with each other in important respects.

Locke acknowledges the similarity of sensation and reflection by contending that reflection might ‘properly enough be call’d internal Sense’ (ibid.) and also speaks of ‘external and internal Sensation’ (E: II. xi. 17, 162). More specifically, there are two common features. First, simple ideas from both sensation and reflection have their origin in the reality of things. Second, they both produce simple ideas passively. These two features are ex-pressed in the following passage: ‘the Mind, in respect of its simple Ideas, is wholly passive, and receives them all from the Existence and Operations of Things, such as Sensation or Reflection offers them’ (E: II. xxii. 2, 288).

The first common feature implies that mental operations per se are as unknown to us as external objects are, unless the internal sensation, i.e. reflection, produces ideas of them. As mentioned, ‘simple Ideas are all from things themselves’ (E: II. xii. 2, 164). As regards mental operations in particular, Locke specifies that the mind’s ‘own Operations, proceeding from Powers intrinsical and proper to it self, … when reflected on by it self, become also Objects of its contemplation’ (E: II. i. 24, 118; underlining added for emphasis). Without reflection the subject of thought could have no ideas, and thus no experience of its mental operations and could not think about its own mental acts.21

The second common feature is passivity. About the reception of simple ideas of external sensation Locke says the following:

the Understanding is meerly passive; and whether or no, it will have these Beginnings, and as it were materials of Knowledge, is not in its own Power. For the Objects of our Senses, do, many of them, obtrude their particular Ideas upon our minds, whether we will or no. [S]imple Ideas, when offered to the mind, the Understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones in it self, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the Images or Ideas, which, the Objects set before it, do therein produce. As the Bodies that surround us, do diversly affect our Organs, the mind is forced to receive the Impressions; and cannot avoid the Perception of those Ideas that are annexed to them (E: II. i. 25, 118; see also II. ix. 1, 143; II. ix. 7, 152–3).

The same paragraph continues about reflection: ‘And the Operations of our minds, will not let us be without, at least some obscure Notions of them’ (see also II. ix. 1, 143). Finally, Locke says quite decidedly a little later: ‘the Mind is wholly Passive in the reception of all its simple Ideas’ (E: II. xii. 1, 163; see also II. xxx. 3, 373). In other words, Locke maintains that in addition to external objects, operations of the mind can impose ideas upon our minds so that we cannot avoid obtaining them. Neither reflection nor sensation are subordinated to the active power of the mind. They passive-ly produce the ‘Beginnings, and as it were materials of Knowledge’ (E: II. i. 25, 118).²² This point becomes important when reflection as internal sense is contrasted with reflection about ideas.

It is proper to point out at the start that reflection and sensation are not analogous in all respects. The mind is present to itself in a way that external things can never be (see E: IV. xxi. 4, 720–1). However, I will argue that Locke, rather than taking such presence to allow the mind’s direct acquaintance with its operations, takes it to mean that there are no mental operations of which reflection does not supply even the faintest idea—while there are, obviously, innumerable external objects and events of which sensation produces no ideas.

²² Recently, Wayne Waxman has placed emphasis on the passivity of the production of ideas of mental operations in Locke (Kant and the Empiricists: Understanding Understanding (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 122–32, esp. 125–6).
Another disanalogous feature resulting from the self-presence of the mind concerns the degree of certainty we can have of the existence of external objects and mental operations. In general Locke trusts the agreement of appearances and what they are appearances of to the benevolence of God. But he adds an independent reason for the justification of our certainty of the knowledge concerning the ideas of mental operations: ‘that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self, can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of any thing, by its dislikeness to it’ (E: IV. iv. 5, 564).\textsuperscript{23} We will see in what follows that an idea of such self-presence is in the background of Locke’s statement that we cannot fail to perceive that we perceive when we perceive, and that we cannot fail to know that this happens to us. Locke’s commitment to consciousness of one’s own existence as intuitive knowledge relies on this principle too.

These are important differences between the functioning of reflection and sensation, but as will become clear, they do not affect the role of reflection and sensation as passive suppliers of simple ideas. Rather, these differences help to elucidate why we have at least obscure ideas of all of our mental operations as well as the inevitability of ‘perceiving that one perceives’, and the degree of certainty associated with the consciousness of one’s own existence.

\textbf{4. Reflection and Contemplation}
Although Locke is clear about the inevitability of the production of ideas of mental operations, some commentators have analysed reflection as involving attention of some kind and as presupposing awareness of its objects. James Gibson argues that ‘the presence of the mind to itself not only renders possible, but essentially involves an awareness of itself and its own operations’, and continues that although Locke maintains that our mental operations do not let us be

\textsuperscript{23} Locke’s topic in the context is complex ideas, but the ground for qualifying for certain knowledge is that the causes of such ideas are not referred to outside of the mind. Therefore, the same justification of certainty applies to the ideas of mental operations.
without at least ‘obscure notions’ of them, ‘a special act of “notice” or attention is, however, required to enable us to form definite ideas of specific operations, and it is this which constitutes Reflection’.

More recently, Martha Bolton has argued that ‘ideas do not mediate perception of one’s ongoing mental acts’ and that ‘reflection occurs when one attends to a mental operation of which one would have some scattered awareness anyway’.

It is now helpful to consider two points separately. On the one hand, there is a question about the nature of the attention that, it is argued, must be associated with reflection. On the other hand, there is a question about the awareness of mental operations that, it is argued, must precede reflection. Take the latter issue first. There are two readings as to what awareness of a mental operation might mean. According to one reading, being aware of a mental operation in fact means receiving an idea of the operation. If this is the case, we are compelled to grant that reflection is not the only source of ideas of mental operations. According to the reading Gibson and Bolton endorse, awareness of a mental operation is neither a means to produce an idea of it nor awareness, by virtue of an idea, of the mental operation. Rather, it is, in a strict sense, a direct experience of the mental operation as one performs it. If this is the case, Locke’s commitment to sensation and reflection as the only sources of ideas is safe, but the price to pay for this reading is to introduce a strange class of immediate objects of experience—objects of which we can be directly aware without any idea to correspond with the experience.

However, Locke is quite clear in maintaining that ‘‘Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the intervention of the Ideas it has of them’ (E: IV. iv. 3, 563); ‘That which

24 Gibson (1917), 57; emphasis added.
26 Bolton (2007), 86; emphasis added.
the Mind is employ’d about whilst thinking, being the Ideas, that are there’ (E: II. i. 1, 104); ‘The Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own Ideas’ (E: IV. i. 1, 525); ‘Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea’ (E: II. viii. 8, 134). Strictly speaking, we can be aware of anything only by virtue of ideas as the immediate objects of experience.

As to the former issue, Locke employs different senses of ‘attention’. He maintains that the mind is properly active only when ‘it with some degree of voluntary attention considers any thing’ (E: II. ix. 1, 143; emphasis added). An active (volitional) notion of attention entails that the potential object of attention is already available in experience. Locke says also: ‘when the Ideas that offer themselves … are taken notice of, and, as it were, registred in the Memory, it is Attention’ (E: II. xix. 1, 227). Here it is possible to read ‘taking notice’ passively, so that it involves no active exertion of the mind. In this case, ‘attention’ would mean that an idea is forceful enough to make itself noticed so that it leaves a memory trace. Be that as it may, it is important that in both cases the object of attention for Locke is an idea. In this light, the kind of attention that Locke is held to associate with reflection, understood as a source of ideas, remains unclear.

It seems that the aforementioned scholars’ motivation for treating Locke’s theory of reflection as involving awareness of one’s mental operations preceding it derives from various passages where Locke speaks of reflection as clearly active. For instance, he sometimes qualifies reflection as involving taking ‘Pains’ (E: I. ii. 11, 52; II.

28 Gibson (1917), 59, says that ‘in the mere reception of [simple] ideas a mental operation of “noticing” or “perceiving” is involved…. a mental function … , which is only elicited by the presence of an external stimulus’. He means that Locke’s statement that the mind is wholly passive in receiving simple ideas is not tantamount to a claim that simple ideas are ‘wholly determined from without, irrespective of any co-operation from [the mind]’ (ibid.; emphasis added). It seems that Gibson is concerned with the mind’s general capacity to receive ideas. I have no objection to this kind of participation of the mind.
vi. 2, 128; II. ix. 10, 147) and speaks of ‘considerable Reflection’ 
(\textit{E}: II. i. 8, 108) or reflecting ‘more or less’ (\textit{E}: II. i. 7, 107). Such 
passages suggest that reflection allows control over it. This 
entails that the mind has to be aware of the objects of reflection, 
because they have to be available in experience to be attended to and 
reflected on.

I argue that the passages about active reflection are not about 
reflection understood as the source of ideas of mental operations, 
but about another type of reflection, which Locke sometimes labels 
contemplation. Inasmuch as directing or focusing of attention plays 
a role in reflection it pertains to the latter type of reflection. The 
most important difference between these two types of reflection is 
that contemplation (as I will hereafter call the second type of 
reflection) has ideas as its objects—and hence is not a source of 
simple ideas.\footnote{Mishori (2004), 161–3, points out a distinction akin to this 
distinction. While I distinguish between reflection and contemplation based on the 
difference in their objects, Mishori treats Locke’s notion of reflection as uniform but as 
involving production of different kinds of ideas: ideas of mental operations as well as ideas of, e.g. 
duration and succession. However, he does not discuss the further difference that the latter kind of ideas 
can be attained only through reflection on other ideas, while the former come about 
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can be attained only through reflection on other ideas, while the former come about 
through reflection on mental operations.} 

Acknowledging this enables us to respect the above-mentioned points: we can treat sensation and reflection on a par with respect to the inevitability of the formation of simple ideas, we do 
not have to allow awareness or consciousness as a third source of ideas, and we are not compelled to allow direct experience of our mental operations, that is, an awareness of X that is not mediated by 
an idea of X.\footnote{It has been argued that Locke is a direct realist (see the first section). The present 
distinction between direct and mediated is independent of whether Locke’s theory of ideas 
as a whole should be called representationalist or direct realist. In any case, a conceptual 
difference would remain between a perception that comes about by virtue of an idea and 
one that comes about without participation of an idea.}

When the mind already has as its material ‘those Ideas, which 
\textit{Sense} or \textit{Reflection}, have offered for its Contemplation’ (\textit{E}: II. i. 24, 
118), it is employed in a specific type of reflectivity. Contemplation
is about ideas: the mind ‘turns its view inward upon it self, and observes its own Actions about those Ideas it has, takes from thence other Ideas [as a result of the operation of reflection], which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things’ (E: II. vi. 1, 127). As a form of retention, Locke defines contemplation as keeping an idea, supplied by sensation or reflection, ‘for some time actually in view’ (E: II. x. 1, 149). As an indication that contemplation requires some attention, or active consideration, Locke points out that a person may come upon the same objects recurrently, ‘but yet he will have but a confused Idea of all the Parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention, to consider them each in particular’ (E: II. i. 7, 107). Such volitional effort of paying heed is absent in reflection understood as a source of ideas. In addition to the difference in their proper objects and their passive and active character, reflection and contemplation differ in that reflection must precede contemplation, since it is the supplier of ideas for contemplation (together with external sensation).

As we have now seen, there are two basic meanings of ‘reflection’ in Locke. Admittedly, he is not terminologically consistent in applying ‘contemplation’ in the meaning of attending to ideas, nor in using ‘reflection’ exclusively in the meaning of a source of ideas. For instance, his one-time expression, ‘he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind’ (ibid.), may be taken to suggest the possibility of direct contemplation of operations of the mind, and hence to undermine his explicit subscription to reflection as the only source of ideas of mental operations.

Firstly, however, we should be cautious about relying on the terminology of ‘the inner’ as a guide to Locke’s conceptual commitments. Secondly, and more importantly, in Locke’s framework it is perfectly acceptable to speak of contemplating one’s mental operations—though, strictly and theoretically speaking, the contemplation of mental operations happens by virtue of ideas of mental operations.

operations achieved in reflection. Indeed, in the next paragraph Locke states: ‘the Understanding turns inwards upon it self, reflects on its own operations, and makes them the Object of its own Contemplation’. The understanding can contemplate its own operations because reflection spontaneously produces ideas of them.\textsuperscript{32}

To eradicate a suspicion that Locke uses expressions like ‘observing’, ‘turning inwards’, ‘reflecting’, and ‘contemplating’ as innocent synonyms, consider Locke’s point in the previously quoted passage, which he provides expressly as a description of reflection as internal sense, yet using such expressions as ‘turning inwards’ and ‘observing’, while being clear about the relation between reflection and contemplation: the mind ‘turns its view inward upon it self, and observes its own Actions about those Ideas it has, takes from thence other Ideas, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things’ (\textit{E}: II. vi. 1, 127). Locke is not scrupulous about the terminology, but makes his conceptual distinction sufficiently clear. Reflection and contemplation differ with respect to their objects and their passive and active characters. As reflection supplies objects for contemplation, the former must also precede the latter.

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Next, by considering Locke’s seeming indecisiveness about the reflective capacities of children, we can clarify the role of attention that many see as an essential element in Locke’s theory of reflection.

\textsuperscript{32} As mentioned, not all instances of ‘reflection’ refer to reflection as the internal sense. Consider Locke’s description of reverie in which ‘Ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the Understanding’ (\textit{E}: II. xix. 1, 227). Reverie is not a state where ideas float in the mind when no ideas of mental operations are being supplied, but a state where ideas float without any reflection on or regard to those ideas. When reflection is said to have ideas as its objects, the concept applied is contemplation. Mishori observes that Locke speaks of reflecting on the train of thoughts which can include such objects as complex ideas: ‘So Locke’s “reflection” could not be understood as perceiving only simple ideas of mental operations’ (p. 157). I agree that the term cannot be always so understood but wish to emphasize that Locke employs a concept of reflection that indeed should be so understood and distinguished from the type of reflection that has ideas as its objects.

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and see how consciousness relates to reflection and contemplation.

’tis pretty late, before most Children get Ideas of the Operations of their own Minds; and some have not any very clear, or perfect Ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives. Because, though they pass there continually; yet like floating Visions, they make not deep Impressions enough, to leave in the Mind clear distinct lasting Ideas, till the Understanding turns inwards upon it self, reflects on its own Operations, and makes them the Object of its own Contemplation. (E: II. i. 8, 107)

On the one hand, Locke says in this passage that most children get ideas of the operations of their minds only fairly late. This may be taken to entail that they do not reflect on them. On the other hand, he states later in the same paragraph that children ‘seldom make any considerable Reflection’ (emphasis added) and he maintains elsewhere that no one ‘can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks’ (E: II. i. 25, 118). These statements seem to entail the presence of at least obscure ideas of mental operations even in children. Kulstad concludes: ‘these points simply cannot be brought into harmony with one another’.

Following Kulstad, let us press the point that Locke expressly says that children get ideas of mental operations fairly late. From this it follows that there must be a period of time when children do not reflect at all, which contradicts Locke’s commitment that one cannot be totally ignorant of the mental operations that pass in one’s mind. Despite Locke’s unfortunate vagueness, I argue that we should take as his view that infants reflect to the extent that they obtain at least faint ideas of their mental operations. In short, this is because infants obviously perform various operations of the mind; having any kind of perceptions (including ‘obscure notions’ of

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33 Kulstad (1984), 165.

34 This might be taken to support the view that it is possible to be aware of one’s mental operations without having ideas of them. As mentioned, such a reading would violate Locke’s central thesis that ideas are the only immediate objects of experience. I will show shortly that it is not necessary to resort to this option.
mental operations) means having ideas, and ideas of mental operations come about only through reflection. However, we do not have to be content with this reason alone but can work out the lengthier quotation above in more detail to see that Locke actually endorses a view that the kind of ideas that come late are a particular kind of ideas, i.e. clear, distinct, lasting ideas. To see this, we have to consider the preceding paragraph, II. i. 7, in its entirety.

7. Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple Ideas from without, according as the Objects, they converse with, afford greater or less variety; and from the Operations of their Minds within, according as they more or less reflect on them. For, though he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain and clear Ideas of them; yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct Ideas of all the Operations of his Mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular Ideas of any Landscape, or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the Parts of it. The Picture, or Clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused Idea of all the Parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention, to consider them each in particular.

The most important point concerns the possibility of reflecting more or less, which encompasses the reflection/contemplation distinction. To reflect ‘more’, attentively, is to contemplate. It is the lack of application of attention that Locke offers as the reason that lets us see why children get ideas fairly late. In the light of paragraph 7, we have to take Locke as speaking of clear, lasting ideas that young children are devoid of, and thus allowing confused or obscure ideas like those one may have of the parts of the clock, which one has never considered with attention. Sections 7 and 8 taken as a whole, together with the general reasons mentioned above, establish that the kind of ideas children get late are clear, distinct, lasting ideas—and this requires the capacity to contemplate. Infants’ incapacity to take pains to reflect, make ‘any considerable Reflection on what passes within them, till they come to
be of riper Years’ (E: II. i. 8, 108; emphasis added), links contemplation with maturity—but scant means in contemplating do not entail a total lack of reflection as internal sense. Indeed, the ideas that are the objects of contemplation have to exist prior to contemplation.

We can now understand the following type of claims in a new light: ‘without consciousness, reflection would not have any objects to reflect upon’⁵⁵ and ‘there are no thoughts and perceptions in the mind of which it is not conscious, although there may be much in the mind which is not reflected upon, thought about, or given any attention’.⁶ We should read ‘reflect’ in the contemplative sense, when the materials for knowledge—ideas—are already present and attended upon. On the level of ideas, but not on the level of mental operations per se, it is correct to say that without consciousness, reflection would not have objects to reflect upon or that there may be much in the mind that is not reflected upon.

Under the current reading we can respect the following tenets underpinning Locke’s epistemology: sensation and reflection are ‘the only Originals, from whence all our Ideas take their beginnings’ (E: II. i. 4, 105) and that ‘whatsoever the Mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea’ (E: II. viii. 8, 134; see also E: II. vii. 9, 131 and E: IV. i. 1, 525). Of course, reflection and sensation are exceptions in that they are operations that do not have ideas as their immediate objects, since they are the sources of ideas and hence have as their objects the ultimate objects. This is one reason for Locke to insist on the inevitability of the formation of simple ideas, for the mind cannot direct any attention to things of which it has no experience. Ideas as the immediate objects of the mind are the

⁵⁵ Thiel (1994), 103. See also Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), I. v, 239.

⁶ McRae (1976), 34. Consider also Mishori (2004), 159: ‘Locke seems to describe “consciousness” as the passive perception of mental contents. This view creates the conceptual space for active perception of mental events’.
immediate experiential objects, i.e. objects of which the mind is conscious (in varied degrees, as will be argued later).

It might be argued that in my reading the functioning of reflection as a source of ideas is mysterious from the experiential point of view of a subject, since reflection allows no volitional control over it and the subject has no consciousness of the objects of reflection before reflection has supplied ideas of them. But once we acknowledge the crucial similarity between reflection and external sensation, there is nothing especially strange in the functioning of reflection. Mental operations are among the things that pass in the mind, but they are not in themselves immediately present to the conscious mind. Reflection is needed to supply ideas of mental operations as the mind’s immediate experiential objects, just as sensation is needed to supply ideas of external objects. For contemplation, as already noted, it is indeed a precondition that the potential objects are in some way available in experience: volitional aiming presupposes a target at least faintly taken notice of.\(^{37}\)

Voluntary attention plays an important role in the formation of clear, distinct, lasting ideas, as well as in the formation of complex ideas (\(E: \text{II. xxi. 1–4, 233–6 and II. xii. 1–2, 163–4}\)), but it is not involved in the production of simple ideas.\(^{38}\)

To conclude this section, let us consider the distinction from a wider perspective. In the \textit{Introduction} Locke says that the ‘Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other

\(^{37}\) Consider the mind’s active role in what Locke calls secondary perception. Viewing the ideas in the memory, ‘\textit{the Mind is oftentimes more than barely passive}, the appearance of those dormant Pictures, depending sometimes on the Will. The Mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden \textit{Idea}, and turns, as it were, the Eye of the Soul upon it’ (\(E: \text{II. x. 7, 152}\)). Locke calls active recalling a search of hidden ideas. Memory signifies for him the power of the mind ‘to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before’ (\(E: \text{II. x. 2, 150}\)). The activity of searching is directedness either towards some particular idea in the memory of which one already has an obscure notion, or in a more general sense, for instance, towards some event in one’s past that one already remembers in outlines. In both cases the understanding has some inkling of what one is searching.

\(^{38}\) See also Mishori (2004), 163.
Things, takes no notice of it self; And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own Object’ (E: I. i. 1, 43). ‘Notice taking’ here must be of a higher order. Locke does not mean that the mind fails completely in noticing itself.\textsuperscript{39} On the contrary, having taken some notice of itself is the very precondition for the understanding’s motivation of self-examination, for with no degree of prior acquaintance the understanding could not even opt for itself. This initial self-acquaintance comes about spontaneously. Here lies the important difference between reflection and contemplation. From the experiential point of view of a subject, the passive nature of reflection signifies the fact that we experience our own mental operations as we perform them (i.e. have ideas of them), while in technical terms Locke understands reflection as a passive operation of producing ideas. Contemplation, for its part, is voluntarily applicable to things that are already within the sphere of experience, and ideas are just such things.

I have already considered some evidence for the view that consciousness does not have the characteristics of a proper act or a passive acting but is rather the concomitant experiential feature of all thought. In order to establish further the distinction between the two types of reflection and consciousness I shall now proceed to a closer examination of the characteristics of consciousness.

5. Consciousness as Experiential Knowledge
Remember that Locke understands reflection as ‘the Perception of the Operations of our own minds within us’ (E: II. i. 4, 105) and consciousness as ‘the perception of what passes in a Man’s own mind’ (E: II. i. 19, 115). The present claim about the difference between reflection and consciousness entails that ‘perception’ is used in different meanings in the two passages: if consciousness does not count as an act of the mind, it cannot be equivalent to

\textsuperscript{39} John Norris, \textit{Cursory Reflections upon a Book Call’d, an Essay Concerning Human Understanding} (1690), Augustan Reprints, no. 93, 1961, 2, rightly observes that if Locke’s statement is taken literally, Locke’s whole project is undermined.
perception understood as an act of the mind. Although Locke provides no independent explanation of how he uses ‘perception’ here, we have good reasons for a reading that renders the two passages consistent with the difference drawn between reflection and consciousness. I have argued that the sense in which reflection is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us is that of a passive acting. It is an act of perception in a similar way that external sensation is an act of perception.

I now have to show that Locke does not apply ‘perception’ in the act sense when he characterizes consciousness as perception. The immediate context provides an important clue. Locke agrees with the Cartesians that it is impossible to think without being conscious of it, but criticizes them for maintaining that the soul must always think. According to Descartes, we are conscious even during sound sleep, even when there is no remembrance of it afterwards. Locke regards this as a ‘bare Assertion’ (E: II. i. 14, 111), since we have no proof that this is the case, and considers it more probable that we do not always think (E: II. i. 18, 115). To come to know whether we are conscious also in sound sleep would require that we retained at least something of our thoughts in the memory (ibid.). He criticizes the Cartesians by presenting an analogy: ‘They who talk thus, may, with as much reason … say, That a Man is always Hungry, but that he does not always feel it’ (E: II. i. 19, 115).

Setting aside the crux of Locke’s disagreement with the Cartesians, by resorting to this analogy we can see that consciousness signifies, in essence, experience: in the characterization of consciousness as the perception of what passes in one’s own mind ‘perception’ is analogous to ‘feel’. The point in Locke’s analogy is that ‘hunger consists in that very sensation [i.e. the feeling of hunger], as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks’ (ibid.). It is the lived-through feeling of hunger that Locke treats as

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analogous to consciousness as perception. Consciousness as perception thus does not mean an act of perceiving, but refers to what is the result of perceiving, i.e. the state of being aware, the feeling of what passes in one’s mind. This reading is further supported by the following passage.

What Perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, etc. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own Mind, cannot miss it: And if he does not reflect, all the Words in the World, cannot make him have any notion of it (E: II. ix. 2, 143).

Here Locke is concerned with a quite specific notion of perception, one he believes is better understood through paying heed to one’s own mental acts than through any gloss of his. The most important thing is that he speaks of perception as something that seeing, hearing, feeling, etc. have in common and hence not of perception as a particular type of mental act or object. The feature shared by these modes of thought (and indeed pertinent to all thinking) is that they come experientially given, a feature one cannot fail to note when one heeds it. Locke’s point is that only the perceiving subject has direct access to the experientiality of thought.

41 Typically scholars have distinguished between act and object senses of perception, e.g. Chappell (1994), 28, and Hight (2001), 20–1. However, this has been in connection with Locke’s frequent equating of idea and perception. Note that I am not introducing lived-through experience as a third independent category in addition to act and object senses of idea.

42 It seems fairly clear that Locke is concerned with contemplation here, as he speaks of reflecting on what passes in the mind and not on mental operations, which would be a narrower class of objects. We thus have the idea of perception present in our experience but we may never have properly noted and considered what perception is.

43 Strictly speaking: paying heed to the ideas of one’s mental acts.

44 In the previous section Locke says of this particular sense of perception that it is the ‘first and simplest’ idea from reflection (E: II. ix. 1, 143). This supports my reading too. Perception being the first and simplest suggests that it is, as it were, transparent and present in all thinking. It signifies lived-through experience itself. Yet, exactly because of its trans-
Locke reckons that it would be pointless to attempt to put into words what he means by perception in the passage, as he believes that one best grasps the meaning by oneself. The reason is broadly the same as that for which Locke scoffs at the Cartesians: ‘it cannot be less than Revelation, that discovers to another, Thoughts in my mind’ (E: II. i. 19, 115). Locke accuses the Cartesians of claiming to know that there are always conscious thoughts in the other man’s mind. He is aware he would not be better off himself in trying to describe what it is like to have a perception, i.e. to be conscious—no explanation could make one obtain this particular notion of perception. Hence, ‘perception’ refers here to the same experiential feature, which Locke illustrated by means of the analogy between consciousness and the feeling of hunger.\textsuperscript{45}

The distinction between reflection and consciousness is now drawn by distinguishing between different notions of perception. It may still seem, however, that mental operations are included in what passes in one’s mind and that hence consciousness and reflection partly overlap each other. They do so in an important way; but, as we have seen, this does not mean that we are conscious of mental operations directly. In the context where Locke characterizes consciousness, the question is indeed about whether one can think and not be conscious of it. To say that one is conscious of

\textsuperscript{45}One reason why Locke does not expressly thematize the lived-through character as something that is given to us in our experience but that we for some reason or another do not always notice is, I believe, that an explanation of such a feature would simply have appeared odd in the early modern context. See Charles Mein (Zachary Mayne), \textit{Two Dissertations Concerning Sense and the Imagination with An Essay on Consciousness} (London, 1728), 142, for a waver opening of the \textit{Essay on Consciousness} that speaks for the oddity of such undertaking: Maybe consciousness ‘needs not to be particularly declared, or it does not admit of any sort of Explication’, as perhaps everyone ‘discovers as much of his Consciousness, immediately, or at single View, … as he shall ever be able to do’. (The authorship of the book has been recently reattributed to Charles Mein by James G. Buickerood, ‘Two Dissertations Concerning Sense, and the Imagination, with an Essay on Consciousness [1728]: A Study in Attribution’, in \textit{1650–1850: Ideas, Aesthetics, and Inquiries in the Early Modern Era}, 7 (2002), 51–86.)
one’s thinking (i.e. mental operations) or of external objects is an acceptable way of speaking in Locke’s framework. But in the light of Locke’s doctrine of the sources of ideas, it is not literally correct. Strictly taken, it is an idea of a mental operation that must have been supplied by reflection or an idea of an external object supplied by sensation by virtue of which one can be said to be conscious. When Locke says that reflection is perception he employs an act sense of perception, the process of producing ideas, whereas by consciousness as perception he means the state of being aware.

Now we can see that the phrase about consciousness being the ‘perception of what passes in a man’s mind’ proves to be quite unrevealing if we do not take into account the complexities pertaining to the notion of perception and that, strictly speaking, it is ideas that we are conscious of, not mental operations (nor external objects) in themselves.46

In addition to the described experiential aspect, for Locke consciousness involves a knowledge aspect. Consciousness is a form of intuitive knowledge that is always predicated of the subject (not of ideas). This becomes especially clear in Locke’s discussion of our knowledge of our own existence. As noted above, Locke maintains that we cannot think without being conscious of thinking, since it is impossible to perceive without perceiving that one perceives (E: II. xxvii. 9, 335). This cannot happen without there being a subject to whom the thinking is given. Thus, ‘in every Act of Sensation, Reasoning, or Thinking, we are conscious to our selves of our own Being; and, in this Matter, come not short of the highest degree of Certainty’ (E: IV. ix. 3, 619). In other words, ‘Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence’ (E: IV. ix. 3, 618). It is important to see that experiential and knowledge aspects are complementary constituents of consciousness: ‘if I know I feel Pain, it is evident, I have as

46 This marks one important point of divergence from Kulstad, who takes the notion of perception in Locke’s characterizations of consciousness and reflection to be the same without question. See Kulstad 1984, 146–7.
certain a Perception of my own Existence, as of the Existence of
the Pain I feel’ (ibid.). The two aspects are also present in Locke’s
description of sensitive knowledge: ‘we may add to the two former
sorts of Knowledge [i.e. intuition and demonstration], this also, of
the existence of particular external Objects, by that perception and
Consciousness we have of the actual entrance of Ideas from them’
\(E: IV. ii. 14, 537–8\).

Locke’s correspondence with John Wynne confirms the know-
ledge aspect of consciousness.\(^{47}\) Wynne enquires from Locke:

Whether the knowledge we have of our own Existence, and the perception of
our Sensations, be not A sort of knowledge \textit{Sui generis} as we say, and
different from Intuitive; and might not more properly be accounted A distinct
sort, under the Name of consciousness?\(^{48}\)

We do not have Locke’s reply but in a later letter Wynne re-
capitulates what Locke had said in answer:

What you have said in answer, … gives A satisfactory account, why you
comprehend under the general Name of Intuition, the Knowledge we have of
our own existence and Thoughts as well as of self-evident Truths; and dos
at the same time allow … that If we come to distinguish nicely, we may
conceive A difference between the Internal perception or Sensation of our
own Existence, the Consciousnes of our thoughts, an
\(\text{d the perception of Self-evident Truths, All which seem to have an equal degree of certainty and}
\text{evidence, tho differing in the objects and manner of perception.}^{49}\)

The question is about the domain of intuitive knowledge, in which
Locke here includes consciousness. It is also noteworthy that in his
enquiry Wynne mentions both the knowledge of our existence and

\(^{47}\) The importance of these letters for the issue at hand is noted in Thiel (1994).

\(^{48}\) John Wynne to Locke, 30 March 1695; Letter no. 1869, in \textit{The Correspondence of

\(^{49}\) John Wynne to Locke, 20 April 1695; Letter no. 1884, ibid. 347.
the perception of sensations as grouped under consciousness, which Locke approves, as far as we can tell from Wynne’s recapitulation.

As is well known, Locke makes use of consciousness in his theory of personal identity. However, I will not dwell on that discussion. Two brief remarks suffice for the present purposes. First, the overall role of consciousness in Locke’s theory of personal identity as uniting ‘distant Actions into the same Person’ (E: II. xxvii. 10, 336) is in accordance with both the experiential and the knowledge character of consciousness. Second, in connection with Locke’s view of personal identity, it is not an uncommon assessment that in Locke’s position ‘consciousness’ is equivalent to ‘memory’. On the whole, this is not what Locke maintains. He is resolute that consciousness ‘is inseparable from thinking’ (E: II. xxvii. 9, 335), whereas remembering is just one mode of thinking: ‘This consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that, which distinguishes Remembrance from all other ways of Thinking’ (E: I. iv. 20, 97). In the context of personal identity, recollection of one’s past thoughts and actions is a relevant act of the mind, but with respect to consciousness in general remembrance signifies only a specific type of experience that includes a reference to previous experiences of the subject.

I conclude that in view of delineating reflection and consciousness, Locke’s concept of consciousness is best understood as experiential knowledge and not as a mental act.

Now with respect to Locke’s commitment to ideas as something of which we cannot fail to be conscious and to the inevitability of the production of simple ideas, it is critical to examine two kinds of passages: where Locke seems to allude to ideas of which the subject is not conscious at all and where he seems to allow mental operations of which reflection does not produce ideas.

50 Antony Flew, ‘Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity’, Philosophy, 26 (1951), 53–68: 55. See also Anna Lännström, ‘Locke’s Account of Personal Identity: Memory as Fallible Evidence’, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 24 (2007), 39–56: 42. She attributes this view to Udo Thiel also. However, Thiel (1994), 105, is clear that Locke’s notion of consciousness is much broader, including, rather than being equivalent to, memory.
6. Unconscious Ideas?

Locke explains a case where an external stimulus fails to give rise to an idea because the mind is engrossed in contemplating something else. In such a case:

[T]hat which uses to produce the Idea, though conveyed in by the usual Organ, not being taken notice of in the Understanding, and so imprinting no Idea on the Mind, there follows no Sensation. So that where-ever there is Sense, or Perception, there some Idea is actually produced, and present in the Understanding. (E: II. ix. 4, 144)

A stimulus reaches the sense organ and a motion that is suited to produce an idea takes place in the organ and in the brain, but no experience ensues. A lived-through sensation must be produced in the mind as a consequence of an external stimulus to amount to an idea. Locke’s example allows for impressions that are not noticed by the mind. This much is clear.

Kevin Scharp argues that such impressions must be mental because the movements in the organs qua physical events cannot be the direct objects of the understanding. Hence, Locke must accept unconscious mental impressions.\(^{51}\) This would mean that Locke had to accept mental impressions as an intermediate sort between the functioning of the nerves and animal spirits (as physical things) and ideas (as experiences). I argue that Locke does not accept unconscious mental impressions and that postulating them is explanatorily unnecessary.

First, Locke says that in perceiving external objects ‘some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain some Motion, which produces these Ideas, which we have of them in us’ (E: II. viii. 12, 136), thus suggesting that the transition from physical events to experiences is direct. Second, the passivity of sensation as a source of ideas is in line with the inevitability of ideas either being or not being produced. As the

\(^{51}\) Scharp (2008), 36–8.
reason why some impressions do not produce ideas, Locke explains that the mind is simultaneously so ‘intently employ’d in the contemplation of some Objects; and curiously surveying some Ideas’ (ibid.). Locke thus speaks of an engrossed person, which Scharp construes rather as a distracted person as he points out that ‘if the mind had been paying attention, an idea would have been created’. According to him, the mind has to direct attention to an unconscious mental impression for an idea to come about. That the impression goes unnoticed depends on the fact that the person does not pay attention, but he could if he choose to.

Surely it is the mind, because of being less absorbed in contemplation (and not the organs), which would behave differently in the given situation if an idea would be produced. But the relevant difference is not about the person’s voluntary attention being directed at the given impression. Rather, when the mind is not intently occupied with something else it is predisposed to receive ideas: ‘Men that have Senses, cannot chuse but receive some Ideas by them’ (E: IV. xii. 1, 650). The direction is important: we do not contribute to the creation of simple ideas by attending to something fairly specific that is not (yet) an idea, but simple ideas are imposed on the mind. One can apply voluntary attention in a few ways. Concerning some specific object that is already experienced, one ‘may chuse whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent application, endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it’ (E: IV. xii. 2, 650). This is basically what Locke understands by contemplation (E: II. xix. 1, 227). On a less specific level one may direct one’s senses at will, for instance by turning one’s head, closing one’s eyes, reaching out one’s hand etc., or perhaps in the sense of being, as it were, on guard about the deliverances of a particular sense (see E: IV. xii. 1–2, 650–1). Along these lines, one

52 We can ask how the person could even direct his attention if he is not already conscious of the thing on some level. Scharp (2008), 49–50, notes that Locke provides no answer. He suggests Locke could reply that one can direct one’s attention to some sensory area without knowing at all what impressions there are.
can also stop one’s intent contemplation at will and thereby make oneself generally alert to one’s environment. We can affect our circumstances voluntarily, but Locke gives no hint of how we could attend to unconscious mental impressions.

The problem that understanding cannot perceive physical things directly is undermined by the fact that ideas of sense are produced passively and largely according to the circumstances the mind happens to be in. Locke neither suggests an intermediate sort of unconscious mental impressions nor is it necessary to postulate such to make sense of the production of ideas. Locke indeed acknowledges that how physical things manage to produce ideas in us is beyond our comprehension:

Impressions made on the retina by rays of light, I think I understand; and motions from thence continued to the brain may be conceived, and that these produce ideas in our minds I am persuaded, but in a manner to me incomprehensible. This I can resolve only into the good pleasure of God, whose ways are past finding out.53

On the question of what takes place when a material impression amounts to an idea, postulating unconscious mental impressions between them sheds no light. Locke could not account for how unconscious mental impressions are rendered out of the movement of animal spirits any better than he can account for how material events give rise to ideas. Moreover, Locke would have the additional problem of explaining how we could pay attention to unconscious impressions. The problem Locke expressly faces concerns understanding how the material can make us have experiences in general. Since he thinks that the transition from material events to experiences is entirely passive and, on top of that, incomprehensible in its details, I conclude that Locke does not allow unconscious mental impressions, and that it is not his view that

53 Locke, An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, §10.
voluntary attention can be paid to things that are not already in the sphere of experience.

I have argued that both reflection and external sensation function passively and unavoidably. But reflection differs from external sense in that the objects of reflection are within the mind from the beginning. Such intimacy suggests that we do not fail to notice our mental operations, just as Locke contends. Let us next consider whether Locke allows mental operations of which we are not conscious, i.e. of which no ideas are produced.

7. Habitual Judgements as Unreflected Operations?
A challenging passage in this respect concerns Locke’s explanation of perceiving a globe:

\[\text{[T]he Ideas we receive by sensation, are often in grown People alter’d by the Judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our Eyes a round Globe, of any uniform colour ..., ’tis certain, that the Idea thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a flat Circle variously shadow’d, with several degrees of Light and Brightness coming to our Eyes. But we having by use been accustomed to perceive, what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont to make in us ..., the Judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the Appearances into their Causes. (\text{E: II. ix. 8, 145})}\]

There is a puzzling issue involved in this story. It has been argued that it rests on the belief that depth is not perceivable by sight, wherefore the mind has to contribute information (originally acquired from tactile sensations of objects) about the perception for it to convey an appearance that corresponds to its cause.\(^54\) Locke

\(^54\) Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, \textit{Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge [1746]}, trans. and ed. Hans Aarsleff (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), Part I, Section 6, §2, p. 102; Michael Ayers, \textit{Locke vol. I: Epistemology} (London: Routledge, 1991), 65–6. However, it may be that we should not extrapolate from this example as regards perceiving three-dimensional objects. Laura Berchielli argues that in Locke’s theory ‘it is possible for sight to receive ideas of three-dimensional figures without having recourse to a judgement’ (‘Color, Space, and Figure in Locke: An Interpretation of the Molyneux Problem’, \textit{Journal of the History of Philosophy} 40 (2002), 47–65: 57).
says that what he describes in the above example is not pertinent to any other ideas than those received by sight (E: II. ix. 9, 146).

In any case, there are two candidates for what possibly goes unnoticed: the idea of a shaded flat circle and the judgement that alters that original idea into an idea of a uniformly coloured convex surface. It seems clear enough that the idea of the circle must be somehow experienced, because Locke speaks of an idea that is imprinted in the mind (as opposed to a physical impression being imprinted on the brain) and because the alteration must also happen in the mind. The nature of the alteration seems to be such that it is by virtue of the judgement that the idea presents itself to the subject differently, not as a circle but as a sphere. In other words, the ideas in question are similar with respect to their phenomenal content, but depending on whether the judgement takes place or not we end up having an idea either of a circle or a sphere. The alteration happens quickly, but the quickness in itself does not entail that we are in no manner conscious of the initial idea. I will specify a little later in what sense we can be said to be conscious of it. For now, let us consider whether the altering judgement as a mental operation passes unconsciously or whether we form an idea of it, and thereby are conscious of it.55

In the immediately following sections Locke speaks more generally of the role of habit in the quick judgements about occurrent sensations, and there he also uses expressions like ‘scarce taken notice’ and ‘little notice’, which not only allow but entail some degree of awareness. It is instructive to resort to what Descartes says on the matter and relate that to Locke’s take on the issue, as their views to a great extent resemble each other. Descartes distinguishes between three grades of sensory response. The first is the bodily stimulation, including the mechanical movements that

55 Condillac (2001), Part I, Section 6, §4, p. 103, criticizes Locke for allowing unconscious judgements and points out that ‘it is useless to base anything on the belief that a good many things seem to occur on the mind of which we take no cognizance’. I argue that Locke in fact shares Condillac’s view.
take place in the brain, that we suffer from external objects. The second grade includes sensation as the immediate effect in the mind. The third grade involves judgement about the external things that the sensation is about. Concerning our experiential relation to our acts of judgement, Descartes notes a difference between perceiving something novel and routine perceptions. In the former case, we easily notice the judgement involved and consequently correctly attribute it to the intellect instead of acquiescently conceding that the perception is entirely due to the senses, as by habit we tend to do in perceiving objects with which we are familiar. In this context, habit means for Descartes that the judgement is performed quick-ly.\(^56\) Importantly, Descartes points out that the two elements—the external perception and the judgement about it—‘occur together and appear to be indistinguishable from each other’.\(^57\) The compound thus appears to the perceiver as internally unified without readily revealing the fact that it consists of separable elements.

Locke says essentially the same about common perceptions and our failures in noticing that an idea is really an idea of judgement rather than that of sense:

> [Judgment], in many cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed so constantly, and so quick, that we take that for the Perception of our Sensation, which is an Idea formed by our Judgment; so that one, \(vix\) that of Sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of it self; as a Man who reads or hears with attention and understanding, takes little notice of the Characters, or Sounds, but of the Ideas, that are excited in him by them.

10. Nor need we wonder, that this is done with so little notice, if we consider, how very quick the actions of the Mind are performed. (E: II. ix. 9–10, 146–7)

Although we recurrently disregard the fact that there are two ideas connected by a mental operation in many instances of sensory response, by way of contemplating our train of thought we can

\(^{56}\) AT VII, 436–8; CSM II, 294–5.

\(^{57}\) Letter to Arnauld, 29 July 1648: AT V, 221; CSMK, 357.
recognize that this is the case. For Descartes and Locke, habit provides quickness and is about not paying heed to something that is present in the experience. It does not make judgement totally unconscious, nor is habit a consequence of some of our judgements becoming unconscious in time. In Locke’s case this means that reflection supplies us with an idea of the operation of judgement, to which we can pay heed.\textsuperscript{58} Indeed, it seems that Descartes’s and Locke’s own recognition of the elements involved in perception is based on contemplating the experience that revealed the actual presence of the constituent elements.

There is a great difference between such passing experiences as the quick judgements and, for instance, the experiential certainty we can have of our existence. But that does not license us to call the former unconscious. The crucial conceptual issue is that our passing judgements differ fundamentally from the way in which we are not conscious of things before they enter the sphere of experience. I conclude that in the passages that we have considered in the last two sections Locke neither accepts unconscious ideas nor subscribes to habitual judgements of which we form no ideas at all.

\section*{8. Degrees of Consciousness}
Through his discussion of degrees of thought and attention, Locke indicates that he allows for a great variety in the ways which the subject of thought experiences the ideas in the mind. Ideas need not be ‘vivid and sensible’ but can be ‘dim and obscure’ as well (\textit{E}: II. xix. 4, 228). When sensation or reflection has supplied ideas, the mind, depending on whether it is remiss or attentive (ibid.), can consider the ideas ‘with intent application’ (\textit{E}: IV. xii. 2, 650) as well as let them ‘pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows’ (\textit{E}: II. xix. 3, 228).

\textsuperscript{58} This is broadly what Condillac maintains too, but wrongly believes that Locke is not of the same opinion. See Condillac (2001), Part I, Section 2, §9, pp. 22–3.
This passage deserves quoting at length:

That there are Ideas, some or other, always present in the mind of a waking Man, every one’s Experience convinces him; though the mind employs it self about them with several degrees of Attention. Sometimes the mind fixes it self with so much earnestness on the Contemplation of some Objects, that it turns their Ideas on all sides; remarks their Relations and Circumstances; and views every part so nicely, and with such intention, that it shuts out all other Thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary Impressions made then on the senses, which at another Season would produce very sensible Perceptions: At other times, it barely observes the train of Ideas, that succeed in the Understanding, without directing, and pursuing any of them: And at other times, it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows, that make no Impression. (E: II. xix. 3, 227–8)

For Locke, it is important that all ideas are potential objects of contemplation, wherefore we need to be conscious of them to some degree. As we have seen, Locke says that sense and reflection passively offer ideas for the mind’s contemplation (E: II. i. 24–5, 118). About the operations of our minds he specifically notes that they will not let us be without at least obscure notions of them (ibid.). The above passage lets us see that this can mean ideas that pass almost unnoticed—the way we are conscious of them can be slight and transient. Locke expresses the same also in terms of degrees of thinking: ‘the mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of Thinking; and be sometimes even in a waking Man so remiss, as to have Thoughts dim and obscure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all’ (E: II. xix. 4, 228).

Since Locke speaks of degrees of thought and attention explicitly, but not of consciousness, some might argue that he does not accept a degree conception of consciousness. However, the discussion is about the mind’s experiential relation to ideas. And it is through allowing that we experience the ideas in the mind in different ways that Locke subscribes to a degree conception of consciousness. To strengthen this reading, it is worthwhile to note that some philosophers influenced by Locke have no difficulty in
characterizing the mind’s relation to ideas in terms of degrees of consciousness. Condillac says: ‘When we are conscious of several perceptions at the same time, we often have greater consciousness of some than others or make a more lively response to their existence. More than that, as the consciousness of some increases, that of others will diminish’. Charles Mein expresses roughly the same as follows: ‘Our Consciousness is perpetually present to our Minds: Tho’ not always alike, or in the same degree, nor equally in every Operation of the Mind, because we are not always in the same degree Conscious’.

We can now see that Locke can well allow us to be conscious by way of our passing judgements or in the sense that young children are conscious of their mental operations through reflection’s supply of confused and obscure ideas of them. At the same time, it is important to note that the division between ‘vivid and sensible’ and ‘dim and obscure’ ideas does not have to coincide with the distinction between ideas that have been merely passively received and ideas that have been contemplated, for as we have seen, depending on the mind’s general alertness, sometimes impressions ‘produce very sensible Perceptions’ (E: II. xix. 3, 228; emphasis added).

At this point, it is also worth noting that when Locke’s view of degrees of consciousness is combined with the present reading of reflection, there is no need for postulating scattered awareness or the like as more elementary experiences of one’s mental operations, at least on the ground that we could not be conscious of ideas in a rudimentary way.

9. Conclusion
I have argued that Locke subscribes to a distinction between

59 Condillac (2001), Part I, Section 2, §5, p. 20.

60 Essay on Consciousness, 164–5.

61 Contemplation, however, is needed for clear and distinct ideas (E: II. i. 7, 107).
reflection as a passive source of ideas and as an active operation about them. Sometimes Locke calls the latter type of reflection ‘contemplation’. The following passage indicates the relation between production of ideas of mental operations and contemplation as an operation about ideas: ‘The Mind receiving the Ideas … from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own Actions about those Ideas it has, takes from thence other Ideas, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things’ (E: II. vi. 1, 127). Even though in many occasions Locke’s unsettled terminology is confusing, I have attempted to show that Locke nevertheless endorses the conceptual distinction.

It seems that a failure to distinguish between reflection and contemplation is in the background of the statements that Locke’s notion of reflection signifies ‘voluntary activity’, 62 ‘a voluntary act of attention is essentially involved with it’, 63 and ‘reflection occurs when one attends to a mental operation of which one would have some scattered awareness anyway’. 64 Let us examine one influential view somewhat closer. Gibson argues that in its self-relation, the mind ‘does not … need to be represented by an idea’ and that all mental functions are for [Locke] functions of thought, and ‘thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks’. Hence ‘the operations of our minds will not let us be without at least some obscure notions of them’. A special act of ‘notice’ or attention is, however, required to enable us to form definite ideas of specific operations, and it is this which constitutes Reflection. 65

Gibson thus maintains that consciousness of our mental operations

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62 O’Connor (1957), 97.
63 Scharp (2008), 28.
64 Bolton (2007), 86.
65 Gibson (1917), 56–7, emphasis added. See also Thiel (1994), 103.
precedes reflection and is responsible for the obscure notions that we minimally have of our mental operations.\textsuperscript{66} In other words, he maintains that in speaking of ‘the obscure notions that the operations of our minds will not let us be without’, Locke does not speak of ideas but means direct experience of mental operations. This means that ‘idealess’ experience is supposed to be possible in Locke’s framework. This does not square with Locke’s explicit commitment that the mind has no other immediate objects of experience but ideas (\textit{E}: IV. i. 1, 525); and indeed, in the paragraph where Locke says that our mental operations do not let us be without at least obscure notions of them, he is expressly concerned with the origin of ideas.

We can treat the voluntary and attentive features that Locke attributes to reflection in various passages so that it is possible to respect his commitment to ideas as the only experiential objects. Moreover, the way in which I have articulated the distinction enables us to treat reflection in keeping with Locke’s parallelism between reflection and sensation so that no special act of notice has to be associated with reflection that sensation would lack.

A related question is whether consciousness of our mental operations is the same as reflection for Locke. Kulstad answers: ‘no consistent or definitive stand is taken one way or the other on the sameness or difference of reflection and consciousness of mental operations’.\textsuperscript{67} I have argued that both reflection and contem-plation

\textsuperscript{66} As the direct textual evidence for the mind’s direct acquaintance with its operations scholars have typically cited \textit{E}: IV. xxi. 4, 720–1, e.g. Gibson (1917), 56, and Bolton (2007), 86. The nature of the understanding’s presence to itself is not the proper topic of the section, but signs and their role in conveying knowledge. In that section Locke says that of the things the mind contemplates none besides the mind itself is present to it, and that therefore ideas are needed to function as signs or representations of the things it considers. While suggestive, the passage does not go far in supporting a renunciation of reflection as a necessary proxy for the mind’s self-acquaintance. The understanding’s presence to itself need not mean more than that anything that is able to form a relation to itself must be somehow present to itself from the beginning.

\textsuperscript{67} Kulstad (1984), 167.
count as acts of the mind (passive and active, respectively), whereas consciousness is occurrent experiential knowledge. It is neither direct (idealess) acquaintance with mental operations nor a source of ideas of mental operations. It signifies experiencing what we think and that we think: ‘when we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so’ (E: II. xxvii. 9, 335). 68

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